The ruling of the Marseille Judicial Court that took us by surprise was handed down on 20 March 2025 in AZ Factory v Valeria Moda. In this dispute, AZ Factory accused the French company Valeria Moda of copyright infringement for marketing garments that reproduced the original features of its “Love from Alber” and “Hearts from Alber” designs. The court accepted the probative value of the blockchain records submitted by AZ Factory, holding that ownership of the economic rights in those garments was established by blockchain timestamps dated 5 May 2021 and 15 September 2021. As a result, Valeria Moda was found liable for copyright infringement and ordered to pay AZ Factory damages to compensate for the harm suffered. 1. Introduction The legal recognition of technological evidence has evolved steadily over recent decades. However, the recent ruling of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille of 20 March 2025 marks a turning point that forces us to rethink the foundations of evidentiary status in intellectual property. In this case, which pitted AZ Factory against the French company Valeria Moda, the court addressed the infringement of copyright in designs registered on a blockchain. What mattered was not only that the hash was admitted as proof of prior existence, but that the court attributed copyright ownership solely on the strength of the blockchain record. There was no prior official registration and no additional contractual documentation. Only technological evidence, apparently objective, automatic and independent of any public body. At first glance, the ruling can be read as an act of legal modernisation: a bold opening towards the recognition of new forms of digital documentation. But beneath that appearance of progress lies a deep structural tension. For if a court can confer subjective rights with full legal effect on the basis of a mere blockchain hash — without institutional verification, without expert evidence on its legitimacy, without prior public registration — what is at stake is not only the acceptance of new evidentiary technologies but the displacement of the very system of safeguards that underpins legal certainty in the attribution of rights. Are we, then, looking at a simple evolution in evidence or at a doctrinal rupture with unforeseeable consequences? Is blockchain qualified and sufficient evidence to establish the existence and ownership of intellectual property rights? Or are we succumbing to the allure of technology without examining its legal implications with due rigour? This structural legal analysis sets out to address these questions from a critical perspective, examining the real weight that can — and cannot — be given to blockchain-based evidence in copyright and, in particular, how it measures up against the classic registration principles that guarantee enforceability against third parties, traceability and legal certainty. 2. Technical and legal foundations of blockchain-based evidence In the field of evidence, one of the essential functions of digital technology is to certify the moment at which content was created or existed, known as timestamping. This mechanism makes it possible to fix a precise, certain date, usually with a guarantee of integrity, for a given document, file or creative expression. Many have hailed the use of blockchain in this context as a disruptive innovation, capable of replacing, or at least competing with, classic electronic certification systems. But what really lies behind this supposed superiority? 2.1. The hash as an evidentiary anchor The evidence submitted in the French case consisted of a hash — a cryptographic fingerprint generated from a digital file — recorded on a public blockchain with a verifiable timestamp. The fundamental property of a hash is that it is a one-way function: any alteration to the original content produces a completely different fingerprint. This makes it possible to show that the corresponding file existed on a given date and has not been altered since. However, the hash does not identify the author or the rightholder, does not by itself prove the creative process, and does not establish a legally binding link between the person who generated it and the protected content. It is, in short, proof of existence and integrity, not of authorship or of subjective rights. Its value as evidence of ownership is therefore limited, unless it is accompanied by other evidence or a presumption in its favour is accepted. 2.2. What sets blockchain apart from other electronic certification systems? Legal practice has long had numerous mechanisms, predating blockchain, for proving the existence, date and integrity of digital documents: Qualified trust service providers under the eIDAS Regulation (such as Logalty, eGarante and Signaturit, among others). Electronic notarial certifications. RFC 3161 timestamps issued by recognised authorities. Certified email, digital acknowledgement of receipt and certified delivery platforms. The most notable difference between these systems and blockchain is that the former rely on a trusted third party, whereas blockchain runs on a decentralised system in which, in theory, no single entity can tamper with the record. This has led many to consider that blockchain offers a superior form of immutability, traceability and resistance to fraud. But decentralisation does not, by itself, guarantee the evidentiary reliability or legal validity of the data, especially if: The blockchain is not auditable or verifiable, or its code is not open. The process of recording the hash is not linked to a qualified electronic identity. There is no chain of custody between the author and the registered content. 2.3. The eIDAS 2 Regulation and the status of electronic ledgers Regulation (EU) 2022/0240, known as eIDAS 2, now at an advanced stage of implementation, introduces for the first time a legal definition of the electronic ledger, expressly including blockchain. It provides that: “An electronic ledger shall not be denied legal effect or admissibility as evidence in judicial or administrative proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in electronic form or that it does not meet the requirements for qualified electronic ledgers.” However, only electronic ledgers operated by qualified providers will benefit from the presumption of integrity, accuracy and chronological ordering under Art. 45g of the draft text. Within the eIDAS 2 framework, therefore: Every electronic ledger is admissible as evidence, but Only qualified ledgers enjoy a reinforced (iuris tantum) presumption as to their accuracy. This point is essential to understanding why the Marseille ruling amounts to a doctrinal break: the court gives substantive effect to a blockchain hash without requiring the ledger to be qualified, the author to be identified by qualified means, or any direct legal link to the content. 3. Critical analysis of the ruling: between evidentiary innovation and the risk of eroding legal structures The ruling of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille is undoubtedly an unprecedented step in the recognition of blockchain as evidence in intellectual property. But what is truly new — and legally troubling — is not that a hash recorded on a blockchain has been accepted as valid evidence, but that this evidence was deemed sufficient to attribute copyright ownership, without any official registration, contract, witness testimony or other supporting evidence. 3.1. From proof of fact to attribution of rights: a qualitative leap Traditionally, evidence in copyright matters has been understood in procedural terms: the point is to prove that a piece of content existed on a given date and under certain conditions. In this case, however, the court went a step further: it held that the technological evidence was enough to declare, as a matter of law, who holds the subjective right in the disputed design. This is a qualitative leap that is not without risk, because it turns a technical evidentiary tool into a direct source of legal entitlement, with no institutional backing and no cross-checking against other safeguards. 3.2. The absence of registration as a breaking point In most legal systems, registration in official registers is not constitutive of copyright, but it does provide publicity, traceability and enforceability against third parties. So although ownership arises upon creation, the strongest and most universally recognised evidence remains registration in national or international intellectual property registers. The decision in question breaks with this systemic logic by declaring ownership on the basis of private, unregulated technological evidence, opening the door to legal uncertainty: What would happen if someone else produced a different but earlier hash on another blockchain? What legitimacy does a non-auditable chain have, with no institutional verification or guarantee of identity? And what if the file linked to the hash had itself been plagiarised, so that the hash proves only possession, not authorship? By overlooking these questions, the court shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, in practice reversing the presumption of innocence in the civil sphere. 3.3. A presumption of legitimacy without institutional control One of the most controversial aspects of the ruling is its implicit acceptance of a presumption of legitimacy arising from the mere existence of the hash on the blockchain. The court appears to take the view that, absent evidence to the contrary, this technical evidence is enough to attribute the right, which means giving attributive, not merely circumstantial, value to a tool that by its very nature neither verifies identities nor controls legal intent. From a comparative perspective, this position departs from the cautious approach of other jurisdictions, which accept blockchain as a means of proving facts but not as the sole basis for attributing rights. In systems such as those of Germany, Spain and Canada, the general rule remains that proof of authorship requires a body of converging evidence, in which blockchain may play a significant, but never exclusive, role. 3.4. A risky precedent in an age of legal hyper-technologisation The main risk of this ruling lies not in the use of blockchain but in the principle it establishes: that a private technology, without official audit or qualification, can replace the traditional function of registration law or of structured judicial evidence. This sets a precedent that may be misread or exploited by economic operators, technology platforms or individuals who, with access to blockchain tools, could present themselves as rightholders with nothing more to back them than a unilaterally generated hash. 4. The principle of legal certainty and its fragility in the face of technological disintermediation The French ruling, which gives attributive effect to evidence based solely on blockchain, without prior registration or institutional verification, raises a fundamental question that goes beyond evidence: can legal certainty survive if the system for attributing rights fragments into multiple private, unaudited technologies beyond public control? The principle of legal certainty, enshrined in most modern constitutional texts (Art. 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution, Art. 1 of the French Civil Code, Art. 1.1 of the Italian Constitution, among others), requires legal rules and procedures to be predictable, stable and accessible, so that citizens and economic operators can foresee the legal consequences of their actions. This principle is not limited to the formal guarantee of legality; it performs a structural function, balancing individual freedom, legitimate expectations and the normative order. In this respect, registration law — in both its public and its procedural dimensions — has historically been one of the pillars of that stability, offering: Publicity vis-à-vis third parties. A presumption of legitimacy in favour of the registered owner. Legal traceability of rights. And, in many cases, international coordination through treaties and interoperable registers. Replacing this model with private registers — such as public or semi-private blockchains — run outside any institutional system amounts to a technological disintermediation of law which, if left unregulated, weakens its own constitutional foundations. This fragmentation, though driven by innovation, risks producing: A plurality of evidentiary truths, with no clear hierarchy. Ownership disputes that cannot be resolved ex ante, only through litigation. Uncertain enforceability against third parties, especially in cross-border relationships or in environments without qualified digital identity. Furthermore, the principle of equal access to effective judicial protection (Art. 24 of the Spanish Constitution, Art. 6 ECHR) could also be undermined if the legal validity of evidence came to depend on the economic or technical means to access a particular blockchain solution, depriving other operators of equivalent but more accessible tools. In this context, it cannot be ignored that law has a protective function that cannot be delegated to technological systems, however efficient they may seem. Replacing legal procedures, public registers or official certifications with decentralised technologies cannot be justified on grounds of efficiency or speed if it undermines the common framework of legal protection. What is at stake is not just the value of a piece of evidence in a particular case, but the regulatory model on which the protection of rights in the digital age is built. 5. Proposal for an integrated framework: harmonising evidentiary technology and institutional safeguards If technological progress poses challenges for law, the answer is not to ignore innovation but to integrate it into a regulatory framework that preserves the structural principles of the legal system. Recognising blockchain as a means of evidence — and even as a tool for attributing rights in some contexts — need not erode legal certainty, provided that clear regulatory criteria, institutional interoperability and verifiable control mechanisms are put in place. 5.1. Blockchain as a complementary tool, not a substitute The first step is to redefine the role of blockchain in the evidentiary ecosystem: not as a substitute for official registers or as autonomous, self-sufficient proof of ownership, but as an additional element of technical evidence, useful for reinforcing existing evidence or preserving it in advance of future disputes. In other words, blockchain should be seen as a means of reinforcing documentation, not as an original source of rights or an exclusive presumption of authorship. 5.2. Qualified providers and audited registers: towards a European legal standard The entry into force of the eIDAS 2 Regulation offers a strategic opportunity to establish a common standard for the legal use of distributed technologies. Specifically, the following could be promoted: The creation of blockchains audited and certified by qualified trust service providers, subject to verification and interoperability within the European market. The integration of qualified digital identity systems (eIDAS) that allow the hash to be linked to an officially recognised natural or legal person. The recording of these acts in public or mixed meta-registers, with traceability and institutional integration. This approach would ensure the reliability of evidence without sacrificing the technological efficiency or automated traceability of distributed systems. 5.3. Interconnecting blockchain and official registers A realistic and technically viable legal route is to interconnect blockchain and public registers, so that: Blockchain records can carry reinforced evidentiary value if validated by the registration system. Public registers accept blockchain-generated evidence as valid prima facie evidence, provided it meets certain technical, identity and integrity requirements. A chain of custody for evidence, recognised by the judicial system, is established, making it possible to prove the authenticity of the content and its link to the rightholder. This approach would harness the efficiency of the technology without giving up the legal safeguards of registration law, creating a hybrid and secure ecosystem. 5.4. A new framework for the digital evidentiary ecosystem The answer is not to choose between the classic model and technology, but to build an intermediate model of evidentiary governance, based on: Common standards for digital evidentiary interoperability. Technological and institutional auditing. Mutual recognition of verified digital evidence, at least at European level. This framework would make it possible to respond to the challenge posed by the Marseille ruling without falling into either technological maximalism or legal anachronism, and would turn the disruptive potential of blockchain into an opportunity to strengthen the digital rule of law. 6. Conclusion The March 2025 ruling of the Tribunal Judiciaire de Marseille marks a watershed in the legal use of blockchain as evidence in intellectual property. Its pioneering nature lies not only in recognising the chronological value of a hash, but in its decision to attribute ownership of a subjective right directly and exclusively on the basis of that technological evidence, without prior registration or institutional verification. This precedent, however innovative, calls into question the fundamental pillars of legal certainty by shifting evidentiary value away from the institutional system towards unregulated, unaudited technological solutions. Attributing rights on the basis of private records, with no public control mechanisms or verifiable legal traceability, opens up a scenario of regulatory fragmentation and structural insecurity that the law cannot ignore. Blockchain technology offers real advantages: immutability, traceability and efficiency. But its potential must be channelled through law, not elevated into an autonomous source of legitimacy. The challenge today is not technological but regulatory: how to incorporate these tools into an evidentiary ecosystem that protects rights, is interoperable and is subject to the principle of legality. Faced with the temptation to replace classic systems with decentralised solutions, the legal response must be one of integration. Technological innovation must not weaken the institutional architecture of the rule of law, nor displace the registration system as an instrument of publicity, protection and legal certainty. It is therefore essential to move towards a hybrid model in which blockchain can play a complementary role within a regulated framework, linked to qualified providers, with digital identity certification and institutional verification. Only then can we ensure that the technological revolution does not erode the structural principles of the legal order, but instead strengthens them and carries them forward into a fair, secure and coherent digital future.